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RECENT DECISIONS
The last case on this matter in Wisconsin prior to the instant case
stated that, regardless of the differentiating facts, Laun v Kipp over-
ruled Uecher v. Sheer wherever they were in conflict and that the
Wisconsin rule is that intrinsic fraud is sufficient under certain cir-
cumstances to warrant intervention of court of equity in relieving
from unconscionable judgments.16 The instant case firmly establishes
this as the controlling law in this forum.
The Throckmorton Case bases its general rule on the fear that the
trouble of retrying each case would be much greater and work
greater hardship than the compensation that would arise from doing
justice in particular cases. This fear seems to be groundless because
in Wisconsin only seven cases have reached the Supreme Court on
this issue since Laun v. Kipp, which expressly rejected the Throck-
morton rule.
17
The position of the Wisconsin Courts seems to be more in harmony
with the spirit and purpose of equity as originally conceived and is a
commendable attempt to escape from the rigidity of rules which to a
considerable extent have destroyed the discretion and effectiveness of
equity courts.18 It is also in harmony with Rule 60 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which rejects the Throckmorton rule.19 It
would seem that this rule should be universally adopted.
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Estoppel-Effect of Overruling a Judicial Decision-Equitable
Estoppel against the Taxing Power of the State-The Wisconsin
Legislature had established a tax' on the declaration by foreign cor-
porations of dividends based on income earned in the state, but the
petitioner relied on an earlier decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court2 and did not deduct the tax from dividends paid by it in the
years 1944 through 1946 because profits were insufficient to offset
losses previously accumulated in the state. The Wisconsin Department
of Taxation acknowledged the same Supreme Court decision and did
not question the petitioner's action until the Supreme Court reversed
its stand in a subsequent case.3 Thereupon, the Department of Tax-
ation assessed the privilege dividend tax against the petitioner upon
16 Amberg v. Denton, 223 Wis. 653, 271 N.W. 396 (1937).
.7 Note, 3 ALA. L. REv. 224 (1950-51).8 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS Sec. 1233 (5th ed., 1925).
'LoFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
".... court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or preceding for the following reasons:
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) ...
I WIS. STATS. (1951), sec. 71.16.
2 J. C. Penny Co. v. Tax.Commission, 238 Wis. 69, 298 N.W. 186 (1941).
3 Department of Taxation v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 250 Wis. 533, 27 N.W. 2d
899 (1947).
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the dividends paid in the years 1944 through 1946. This appeal is from
the judgment of the Circuit Court affirming the Board of Tax Ap-
peals' denial of petitioner's application for abatement of the assess-
ment. Held: Judgment reversed. Although the overruling of a judi-
cial decision is a declaration that the former decision never was the
law, to avoid injustice the overruled decision may be considered law
for intermediate transactions. Libby, McNeill, & Libby v. Wisconsin
Department of Taxation, 260 Wis. 551, 51 N.W. 2d 796 (1952).
Although the effect of overruling one of its own judicial decisions
is a matter to be determined by the highest court of each state,4 the
majority of courts hold that the overruling of a judicial decision is
retroactive and is a declaration that the former decision never was
the law.5 Because of this retrospective effect, injustice and hardship
to persons relying on the overruled decision are inevitable. Different
state courts have attempted to alleviate this injustice while neverthe-
less preserving the rule by various methods.
Three exceptions to the rule that an overruling decision operates
retrospectively are generally recognized. An overruling judicial deci-
sion may not operate retrospectively so as to impair the obligations
of contracts entered into in reliance on the overruled decision,6 nor
injuriously affect vested rights acquired in reliance on the overruled
decision,7 nor make criminal an act which was not criminal under the
overruled decision. The retrospective effect of the overruling decision
is prevented from extending to the overruled case itself, or to cases
intermediately decided in light of the overruled case, by the principal
of res judicata9 or "law of the case."'1 Some courts have avoided the
retrospective effect entirely by making an express declaration in over-
ruling the former case that the overruling decision shall operate pros-
pectively only." In cases where the necessary elements were present,
other courts have, as in the instant case, invoked th doctrine of estoppel
to avoid injustice and hardship which would otherwise result from
giving the overruling decision retrospective effect.1
2
4 Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Company 287
U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360, 85 A.L.R. 254 (1932).
5 21 C.J.C. COURTS §194a; 14 Am. JuP- CoURTs §130; Laabs v. Tax Commission,
218 Wis. 414,261 N.W. 404 (1935). For a history of the rule and criticism of it,
see Comment, 28 ILL. L. REv. 277 (1933) ; Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts
of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. Rav. 409 (1924).
621 C.J.S. COURTS §194b; Laabs v. Tax Commission, supra, note 5.
7 Ibid.8 Laabs v. Tax Commission, supra, note 5. For cases and discussion see Note,
49 A.L.R. 1273 (1927).
950 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS §592.
20 21 C.J.S. COURTS §195.
"1 Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131, 156
P. 2d 340 (1945) ; Gibson v. Phillips University et al., 195 Okla. 456, 158 P. 2d
901 (1945).
12La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle v. California Employment
Commission, 56 Cal. App. 2d 534, 133 P. 2d 47 (1943).
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There is no black and white distinction as to when a state govern-
ment may or may not be estopped.' 3 However, the rule is generally
accepted that a state may be estopped in its proprietary capacity but
ordinarily not in its governmental capacity.' 4 The basis of the refusal
to invoke estoppel against a state goes back to the principle of sover-
eign immunity from suit and the old maxim that "the King can do
no wrong."'" Consequently, there seems to be no reason why the state
should be immune from estoppel when acting in a proprietary capacity.
In cases dealing with the taxing power of the state, the courts are
particularly reluctant to apply estoppel' 6 since taxation is unquestion-
ably a governmental function and one so essential to the existence of
the state.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin early recognized that the prin-
ciple of equitable estoppel extended to the state.' 7 However, the court
soon after expressed its refusal to apply estoppel to the taxing power
of the state, although affirming that the state could be estopped when
acting in a strictly proprietary capacity.' 8 The reason given for this
refusal was one of public policy. It was felt that the taxing power
was too essential to the state to be subject to estoppel.' 9 Yet, in a more
recent case, the court indicated that it would have estopped the state
even in its taxing power, had all the necessary elements been present.20
However, even in this case the court distinguished estoppel against an
individual from estoppel against the state taxing power.2 1
The principal case climaxes the trend of the Wisconsin Supreme
'
3 For a complete discussion of estoppel against government see Note, 1 A.L.R.
2d 338 (1948).
'431 C.J.S. EsToPPziL §138a; Comment, 23 WASH. L. REv. 51 (1948).
'5 Supra, note 13, at 340; Comment, 35 MARQ. L. REv. 176 (1951).
16 After noting that the elements of estoppel were present, the Arizona court
concluded, "Still, it is the settled law of the land and of this jurisdiction that
as taxation is a governmental function, there can be no estoppel against a
government or a governmental agency with reference to the enforcement of
taxes." Duhame v. State Tax Commission, 65 Ariz. 268, 179 P. 2d 252 (1947).
For other cases see 31 C.J.S. ESTOPPEL §147.
17 State ex rel. Attorney General v. Janesville Water Company and others, 92
Wis. 496, 66 N.W. 515 (1896). Here the state was estopped from annulling
the franchise of a corporation, apparently an exercise of the police power and
therefore a governmental function.
18 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha Railway v. Douglas County and
others, 134 Wis. 197, 114 N.W. 511 (1908).
'9 Ibid. at 209: "That the taxing power is of vital importance, that it is essential
to the existence of government, are truths which it cannot be necessary to re-
affirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by all. It would seem that the
relinquishment of such a power is never to be assumed."
The court concluded that "we are constrained to hold that the complaint
shows the land to be subject to taxation, and that there can be no estopel in
pais asserted against the exercise by the state of the taxing power of the state."
20 Miller v. Department of Taxation, 241 Wis. 145, 5 N.W. 2d 749 (1942).2 1 Ibid. at 147: "A distinction must be drawn between a benefit to an individual
in a private transaction and the receipt of taxes by the state officers. The taxes
represent a just debt to the state, and the people of the state have an interest in
seeing that each taxpayer bears his fair share of the tax burden."
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Court toward a very liberal outlook in respect to estoppel against the
state. This attitude seems very much in keeping with present circum-
stances and modern conditions.
22
It appears certain that in future cases the court will allow the
state to be estopped even in its taxing power provided the petitioner
has so changed his position in reliance on the actions of an author-
ized state agency "that an inequitable result would ensue to it [the peti-
tioner] if the estopped were denied."23 Apparently, this inequitable
result will ensue only when a tapayer has parted with the money he
would otherwise have used to pay the taxes, as in this case, where the
petitioner would have been compelled to pay out of its own funds a
tax which it could otherwise have deducted from dividends paid to
its stockholders. It is doubtful that estoppel would be invoked against
the taxing power of the state in any less drastic instance, for the
Wisconsin court has refused to invoke estoppel where the overruling
of a prior decision resulted in an assessment of back taxes against the
taxpayer, together with an interest penalty for failure to pay the tax
on time.2 4 Although this may seem inequitable, the court reasoned
that the petitioner was no worse off paying the tax at one time than at
another, and since he had meanwhile had the use of the money, it was
not unjust to require him to pay interest.25 The distinction, between
a case where the taxpayer has parted with the money from which he
would otherwise have deducted the tax, and one where he is merely
required to pay at a later date taxes which he would have paid earlier
from the same funds, is genuine and is not merely hair-splitting on the
part of the court.
Apparently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has gone as far as it
will, and as far as any court should, in applying equitable estoppel
against the state. To allow the state to be estopped to the same extent
as an individual would hardly seem wise.26 Yet, it is obviously an
injustice to exempt the state entirely from estoppel, disregarding the
equity of the matter. The court has struck a happy medium in the
principal case. DARRELL L. PECK
22 "When governmental bodies were in the early stages of development, strict
adherence to the governmental-propietary distinction as to matters of estoppel
might have been advisable in order to permit development with a minimum of
interference. This is a less valid argument today when most government
bodies are as well organized and financed as large businesses." Comment, 23
WAsH. L. REv. 51 (1948).
23 Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation, 260 Wis. 551,
559, 51 N.W. 2d 796 (1952).
z Supra, note 20.
25 Ibid. at 423. "It might be quite a different thing if high rates of interest or
penalties, wholly unrelated to the fair value of the use of the money, had been
imposed."
26 "The doctrine of estoppel is not applied as freely against governmental agen-
cies as it is in the case of private persons." Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wis-
consin Department of Taxation, supra, note 23 at 559.
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